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MAKING A LAST MINUTE SAVE?  
VALUE CHAIN STRUGGLES, WORK ORGANIZATION, AND OUTCOMES FOR LABOR               
IN THE FOOTBALL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY OF JALANDHAR, INDIA  
 
ABSTRACT 
Recent academic writings have emphasized that an increasing proportion of world-wide 
manufacturing is taking place through extensive subcontracting networks that connect consumers in 
the United States and Europe with workers laboring in the informal economies of developing 
countries where they often lack social protection or legal recognition under national labor laws.  In 
this article, we make a contribution to this literature by exploring how three different forms of work 
organization – factory-based, center-based, and home-based football stitching - came into being in 
the brand sensitive, export-oriented football manufacturing industry of Jalandhar in North India. We 
argue that the evolution of supply chain linkages and work forms within this industry can best be 
understood through the ‘prism’ of value chain struggles between the intra-chain actors such as 
international buyers and local suppliers and the extra-chain actors such as national governments and 
international NGOs. In particular, struggles over supplier upgrading and labor standards first led to 
the creation of football stitching as a cottage industry in the latter part of the 20th century and then its 
re-establishment as industrial factory-based work in the early parts of the new millennium. We 
conclude that shifting preferences of the upstream buyers and the global consumers, somewhat 
ironically, offer a Hobson’s choice to the Jalandhar football manufacturers: either insource football 
stitching within factory-based settings, adopt new technologies, and comply with labor 
laws/standards, or perish in the highly competitive global market.  




On June 7th 2010 the Washington-based NGO the International Labor Rights Forum published a 
report entitled “Missed the Goal for Workers: the Reality of Soccer Ball Stitchers in Pakistan, India, 
Thailand, and China” (ILRF 2010).  The publication of the report coincided with the launch of the 
2010 soccer World Cup in South Africa and highlighted the plight of workers engaged in the most 
labor intensive aspect of football manufacturing, soccer ball stitching. According to the report, 
widespread labor rights abuses prevail in the international soccer ball manufacturing industry. For 
example, in India’s main export-oriented football cluster, Jalandhar, soccer ball stitchers were found 
not to have any contracts and social insurance. They were not paid the local minimum wage and 
suffered from severe occupational health and safety problems. In practice, they were mostly 
employed in the subcontracted supply chains of local manufacturers, lacking formal recognition as 
workers and real possibilities for exercising rights such as freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. 
 
The reality of soccer ball stitchers laboring in the supply chains of international sports brands in 
Jalandhar can also be seen as part of a broader world-wide phenomenon which Wills (2009) calls 
subcontracted capitalism. According to Wills, whereas employment and labor relations were mostly 
associated with factory-based work in the 20th century, subcontracted forms of employment are 
becoming paradigmatic in the 21st century. Throughout the world an increasing number of both 
government and private sector workers are thus engaged in subcontracted forms of employment with 
implications for the conditions, experience, and politics of work. For employers subcontracted 
capitalism appears to constitute a way to “cut costs, shed responsibility, increase flexibility, and 
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disempower the workforce” (p. 444).  For workers however, the nature of short-term employment, 
increased competition between contractors, and the lack of direct contact with their “real” employer 
at the top of the manufacturing chain serve to lower wages, undermine standards at work, and break 
the ability of workers to organize jointly due to the decentralized nature of work organization.   
 
However, in the case of the Jalandhar football manufacturing industry, it would appear as if 
subcontracted capitalism is beginning to reach its limits. On the one hand, the late 20th century saw 
the process of football stitching being outsourced to football stitchers laboring in their homes and 
designated football stitching centers outside the framework of Indian labor laws. In other words, the 
late 20th was marked by a process of deindustrialization as factory-based football stitching was 
transformed into a cottage industry. On the other hand, at the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century, we appear to be witnessing a process of re-industrialization as the cottage industry is now 
again being replaced by factory-based football stitching and the extensive subcontracting networks 
being eliminated with significant consequences for work organization, employment, and labor 
conditions within the industry. The question is why these changes in the vertical organization of 
supply chains and horizontal forms of work organization have taken place in the football 
manufacturing industry of Jalandhar?  
 
In this article, we explore how the different work forms in football stitching - home-based, stitching 
center, and factory-based work - came into existence in the Jalandhar football cluster, the reasons 
why football stitching was outsourced through dense subcontracting networks in the latter part of the 
20th century and now appears to be insourced once again in the beginning of the 21st century.  Our 
main line of argument is that the development of home-based, center-based, and factory-based 
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football stitching in the Jalandhar football manufacturing industry can be seen as outcome of 
different value chain struggles between intra-chain actors such as international buyers and local 
suppliers – and extra-chain actors such as national governments and international NGOs. We 
categorize these struggles under two broad headings: struggles over firm upgrading and struggles 
over labor standards. We conclude that subcontracted capitalism such as the development of home-
based and centre-based forms of football stitching in Jalandhar reaches its limits when local firms are 
faced with sustained pressure for compliance with international labor standards and technological 
upgradation. In fact, football stitching in Jalandhar is in the process of being insourced, instead of 
outsourced, as the Jalandhar football manufacturing firms struggle to survive. 
 
The article is divided into six parts. The first section provides an introduction to the Jalandhar 
football manufacturing industry. We then move onto describing the methodology that we used to 
identify the evolution of the dominant work forms and supply chain linkages involved in football 
stitching in the city and nearby villages, and how we mapped the work conditions of those involved 
in home-based, stitching center, and factory-based football stitching in Jalandhar. In the third section, 
we present our main analytical framework, arguing that the development of home-based, center-
based, and factory-based football stitching in Jalandhar can be seen as outcome of different value 
chain struggles over the process of firm upgrading and labor standards within the industry. In the 
subsequent empirical analysis, we use this framework to explain why and how football stitching was 
first subcontracted to home-based and center locations, and now appears to be “insourced” within 
factories again. Moreover, we discuss the implications of this analysis for the relationship between 
supplier upgrading, compliance with international labor standards, and work organization in relation 
5 
to our analytical framework. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main findings and the policy 
conclusions of this analysis. 
 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND:                                                                                                       
THE JALANDHAR FOOTBALL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY  
In this section, we give an introduction to the Jalandhar football manufacturing industry, its main 
export challenges, supply chain networks, and forms of work organization. As Table 1 shows below, 
the export-oriented Indian football manufacturing industry which is almost exclusively located in 
Jalandhar remains a relatively marginal player in terms of its share of exports from the four main 
manufacturing locations in the world: China, Pakistan, Thailand, and India.  
 
Table 1: Exports of Inflatable Ballsi from China, Pakistan, Thailand and India, 2003 – 2009 
(US$000) 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
China 176,097 229,038 272,900 348,420 394,044 501,873 454,446 
Pakistan 112,531 184,225 185,641 225,910 161,149 160,492 118,425 
Thailand 47,342 77,791 59,964 71,287 65,647 68,378 59,336 
India 13,623 18,659 19,130 22,781 N/A 27,093 20,475 
Source: Nadvi et al. forthcoming.  
Whereas China has increased its exports manifold in the period since 2003, India has - along with 
Pakistan and Thailand – remained relatively stagnant. As compared to Chinese producers in this 
industry, the Jalandhar producers have been slow to upgrade in terms of inventing new footballs or 
engaging in mechanized forms of production that could facilitate an increase in their productivity. 
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The Jalandhar football manufacturers mostly make medium-quality training and lower quality 
promotional handstitched balls, but do not have the capacity to produce the quantity of footballs 
required by some of the world’s largest bulk buyers such as Nike and Adidas. Instead, the Jalandhar 
producers have specialized in producing smaller volumes of handstitched balls to niche markets in 
Europe, North America, and developing/transition economies. Amongst the top buyers from the 
cluster are medium-sized brands as UK-based Mitre and the French sports retail chain, Decathlon. 
The cluster also supplies a range of non-branded international buyers and football clubs such as 
Premier League Clubs that require smaller volumes of low-cost, promotional balls that are not 
usually supplied by the large-scale mechanized football suppliers in China.  
 
The Jalandhar football manufacturing industry is made up of approximately 10 medium-sized firms 
and 40 smaller producers (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2009). These manufacturers employ 4.000 
‘core’ workers inside their factories and outsource the process of football stitching via a network of 
1.000 contractors to 12.000 registered and an unknown number of unregistered stitchers. The 
registered stitchers work in 3.300 stitching units. These units are either designated stitching centers or 
home-based locations in the central part of the Jalandhar, the villages surrounding the city (e.g., in 
Adampur 50 kilometers East of Jalandhar), or the town of Batala which is located about 80 
kilometers West of Jalandhar, close to the Pakistan border. Out of 3.300 stitching units, 
approximately thirty are stitching centers that have been set up by some of the largest manufacturers 
in order to ensure that football stitching takes place inside a controlled space where the 
presence/absence of child laborii in the process of football stitching can be monitored. A stitching 
center usually consists of a building or an outside court yard covered by four walls which is rented or 
owned by a contractor (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010).  These contractors transport the panels and 
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thread used to stitch the footballs from the factories to the stitchers and back to the factories again 
once the balls have stitched. Some stitchers also directly pick up these panels and the thread from the 
factories, take them home, and return them to the factories once stitched. Football stitching is done by 
landless workers, and the majority of them are Hindus belonging to the scheduled castes (dalits). 
Skills development within the cluster is a process of a “natural” evolution where stitchers acquire the 
skills from either their family or neighbors and friends. At the household level, the balls are often 
stitched by more than one family member. Children also become involved in the stitching of footballs 
at home, usually being involved in the light processes of waxing the thread or putting holes into the 
leather. As they grow older, they learn to stitch an entire football on their own.  
 
At the end of the 1990s, international news reports started to emerge about the involvement of 
children in the stitching of footballs in Jalandhar. As the cluster’s leading football manufacturers 
were concerned that the industry might face an international boycott, a group of app. 25 
manufacturers decided to form the non-profit organization the Sports Goods Foundation of India 
(SGFI) with the aim of addressing the child labor issues within the cluster. The work of the SGFI has 
concentrated on two main areas: first, with assistance from FIFA and the Swiss accreditation firm, 
SGS, the SGFI developed a mechanism for child labor monitoring within the cluster that consists of 
both an internal and an external part. With support from the United Nations Industrial Development 
Programme (UNIDO), the SGFI has also developed a number of social projects for football stitchers 
and their families including tuition centers, child labor schools, health camps, savings schemes for 
female football stitchers, a common machine-stiching facility, and an NGO, REACH, that gathers 
used clothes and other items in rich communities and distributes them to poor communities in central 
Jalandhar (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2009).  
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In short, the Jalandhar football manufacturing industry has remained a relatively small player in the 
global football manufacturing industry and faces significant challenges in relation to upgrading its 
products, manufacturing processes, and complying with international labor standards, particularly the 
norm that child labor should not be involved in football stitching. In the next section, we discuss how 
we went about mapping the evolution of vertical supply chain linkages, horizontal forms of work 
organization, and work conditions within the industry between 2007 and 2011. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The data generated for this study is based on fieldwork carried out for three different projects, and 
that focused on export marketing, collective corporate social responsibility interventions, and work 
conditions in the Jalandhar football cluster. One of the authors of this article carried out a study on 
the export marketing activities and challenges faced by Indian sports goods firms, based on an 
interviews with thirty seven sports goods exporters in Jalandhar. The research questions focused on 
issues such as export performance, capacity utilization, manufacturing practices, export quality 
parameters, constraints faced, co-operation arrangements and use of information and communication 
technology in the Jalandhar football cluster.  
 
We jointly carried out fieldwork for a period of five months in Jalandhar from January until May 
2008 in connection with a study sponsored by UNIDO that investigated how the Jalandhar football 
cluster (and its counterparts in the Pakistani football industry had responded to international child 
labor allegations and CSR compliance pressures in the period between 1997 and 2007). As part of 
that study, we interviewed five medium-sized enterprises and four small enterprises in Jalandhar 
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football cluster.  In terms of collective industry associations, our work was facilitated by the SGFI 
and the Sports Goods and Manufacturers Export Association in Jalandhar. They not only served as 
our guides in the cluster during initial field visits, but also helped increase our understanding of the 
vertical value chain linkages between local producers and international buyers as well as horizontal 
cluster linkages between Jalandhar-based football manufacturers through repeated discussions. In 
2008, we furthermore interviewed a number of other relevant stakeholders in Jalandhar. These 
included the Deputy Commissioner of Labor, Jalandhar, who shared his views with us regarding 
labor rights in the cluster. We met representatives from NGOs, the Lions Club, NGO Volunteers for 
Social Justice, REACH and BBVA that told us about their interventions in the industry aimed at 
helping local stitchers. We also visited the micro-credit projects, schools and tuition centers of the 
SGFI, a volunteer hospital started by one of the manufacturers in the cluster, and the philanthropic 
foundation established by another manufacturer that provides scholarships for students from 
disadvantages backgrounds. This was complemented by repeat conversations with staff from the 
UNIDO that had implemented different interventions in the Jalandhar football industry for a period 
of five to six years before our arrival. Finally, we undertook several visits to local male and female 
stitching centers inside central Jalandhar and the nearby villages of Tajpur and Talhan as well as 
home-based stitching units where we carried out 5 initial test interviews with center and home-based 
stitchers in each village.   
 
During our final round of fieldwork between June and December 2009, we worked on a study of 
work conditions in the international football manufacturing industry sponsored by the Danish Social 
Science Research Council. During this fieldwork we interviewed four manufacturers that we had 
previously met. Our reason for selecting these manufacturers were that two of the manufacturers had 
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their footballs stitched in stitching centers and two had their balls stitched exclusively by home-based 
stitchers as we intended to do a qualitative process of mapping their supply chain linkages, forms of 
work organization in the stitching process, and the conditions of football stitchers laboring in these 
chains. This allowed us to map the two main types of football stitching supply chain in the cluster 
and work conditions of stitchers taking part in the work forms: home-based and center-based 
stitching. Our interviews with these firms focused primarily on how they managed their stitching 
supply chain, particularly their contractors, and whether, and if so, how they monitored work 
conditions amongst their football stitchers in these chains. We then took one step down the supply 
chain and interviewed contractors, focusing on how they carried out their work, the financial benefits 
they received from this work, and how they managed their relations with their stitchers. At the 
bottom of these chains, we interviewed home-based football stitchers and center-based stitchers about 
their relations with their contractors and their general work conditions including issues such as daily 
wages, piece rates received per ball, daily productivity in terms of balls stitched, availability of work, 
work hours, occupational health and safety, trade union membership, presence/absence of collective 
bargaining mechanisms, and social support mechanisms including the presence/absence of NGOs in 









Table 2: Respondent Profile in Our 2009 Fieldwork 











Home Based Stitchers 















Total Respondents 43 
 
Finally, we had the chance to revisit Jalandhar in April 2011 where we made a presentation of the 
findings contained in this paper and discussed them with 19 of the SGFI’s members during a two and 
a half-hour meeting. We also made repeat visits to four of the firms that we had visited earlier. These 
were the firms that had begun to make the transition to machine-based stitching within the cluster.  In 
the next section, we introduce our analytical framework which seeks to explain how the evolution of 
different forms of work organization (factory, center, and home-based work) may be understood as 
an outcome of value chain struggles between intra-chain actors such as international buyers and 
extra-chain actors such as national regulatory agencies and international NGOs.  
 
TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
As described in the introduction to this article, subcontracted capitalism appears to be a process that 
has not only been taking place in Jalandhar. As Naomi Klein (2000) wrote in her best-selling book, 
No Logo, many multinational companies are no longer the official owners of the factories that they 
are sourcing their products from. Instead they subcontract the manufacturing, transportation, and 
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distribution of their products and services to other firms. From this point of view, they have become 
“hollow corporations whose core competences lie in the management of world-wide networks of 
suppliers and their own corporate and products brands instead of the people, products, and goods”.  
 
Since the end of the 1990s, global value chain analysis has emerged as a novel methodological 
framework that allows us to analyze these processes of economic globalization and international 
trade (Nadvi 2008).  Global value chain analysis focuses on how the input supply, production, trade, 
consumption and disposal of goods and services are coordinated on a global scale in interfirm 
relationships (Altenburg 2006, Gereffi et al. 2005, Gibbon and Ponte 2005, Bair 2005, 2009). To date 
much of the discussion in the global value chain literature has been based on Gereffi’s (1994) 
original conception of how such chains were internally governed. His original approach to 
governance focused on how a functional division of labor was achieved throughout the chain, 
resulting in the allocation of resources and gains for different chain actors. Governance was here 
mostly seen in terms how lead firms were able to drive chains by determining the allocation of value-
added activities were along the chain, the inclusion and exclusion of particular actors along the chain, 
and the terms of chain participation (Ponte 2009). Another central theme in the GVC literature has 
been how suppliers in developing countries might link up with lead firms and learn from the 
interaction with them. The emerging consensus in this literature appears to be that supplier firms may 
quickly learn how to produce better products more efficiently through such linkages, but that lead 
firms are likely to block any attempts at encroaching upon their core competences; the design and 
branding of their products.  At the same time, linking up with lead firms may also pose considerable 
risks for developing country suppliers in instances where lead firms redirect their sourcing to other 
production locations that they find more attractive (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002, Schmitz 2006).  
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In this article, we will use a more recent articulation of the global value chain analysis that seeks to 
integrate the perspectives of how global value chains intersect with regional production systemsiii. 
Neilson and Pritchard (2009) argue from a geographical perspective that liberalized engagement with 
global markets along with forces of consumer activism reflect as series of global value chain 
struggles. These struggles are outcomes of conflict and tensions created due to the interplay of new 
form of value chain governance with differentiated institutional environments that determine the how 
the producers are inserted in global value chains, the level of control they can exercise within them, 
and economic returns for the producers. Institutional environments are here understood as both 
formal organizational types (e.g., national regulatory authorities) and rules and regulations (e.g., 
laws) as well as informal rules of the game including the norms and values that guide how goods are 
to be manufactured.  Neilson and Pritchard broadly identify four types of struggles that ensue from 
the interaction between global value chains and regional production systems: a) struggles over 
supplier upgrading, b) struggles over labor and livelihoods, c) struggles over environmental 
governance, and d) struggles over the fate of smallholders.iv   
 
Neilson and Pritchard’s framework was based upon their analysis of value chain struggles taking 
place in the context of South India tea plantations. However, in the context of this article, we are 
analyzing (i) how value chain struggles have influenced the evolution of different work forms 
(factory, center, and home-based forms of football stitching) in the Jalandhar football manufacturing 
industry, (ii) why these work forms came about, and (iii) how their emergence has affected work 
conditions amongst football stitchers within the industry.  Hence, we adapt Neilson and Pritchard’s 
framework to the particular case that we are studying. Based on our extensive fieldwork in Jalandhar 
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between 2007 and 2011 and knowledge of the industry, we thus hypothesize that value chain 
struggles over firm upgrading and labor standards compliance are the ones that eventually determined 
how and why factory, center, and home-based football stitching have emerged in Jalandhar. In our 
adapted framework, we also assume that these struggles have had significant implications for the 
work conditions of football stitchers taking part in each work form. Our adapted analytical 
framework is presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Value Chains Struggles in the Jalandhar Football Manufacturing Industry 
Source: Adapted from Neilson and Pritchard (2009) 
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they need to upgrade to the use of machine-stitching in the production of training and promotional 
balls. The use of the handstitching technology may be possible in factory-based, center-based, and 
home-based work settings. Hence, if firms use handstitching, work may be organized through 
subcontracting arrangements that link local suppliers with centre or home-based stitchers. However, 
if local suppliers upgrade to machine-stitching, they will have to insource the stitching process within 
the factory premises as machine-stitching of footballs needs to be organized in production lines that 
are closely linked to the other aspects of the football manufacturing process. Struggles over labor 
standards relate to the question of whether the use of child labor should be permitted in the process 
of football stitching, and whether local firms need to comply with national labor laws in order to be 
able to export their products abroad. As child labor might be difficult to exclude from the supply 
chain if football stitching is undertaken in thousands of dispersed home-based locations, local 
manufacturers may have incentives to centralize the process of football stitching in stitching centers 
or in factory-based environments. At the same time, if local suppliers are to abide with national labor 
laws, this would encourage them to insource the process of football stitching into factory-based 
settings where football stitchers would be covered by the provisions of national labor laws even if 
this might increase their cost structures. However, if football manufacturers wish to avoid complying 
with local labor laws in order to reduce their production costs, outsourcing of football stitching to 
home-based locations or stitching centers not covered by any labor laws may be an attractive option.  
 
In terms of consequences for workers, struggles over upgrading could follow two broad scenarios. If 
handstitching is the technology which is used to stitch footballs, football stitchers might either be 
working in formal factory-based environments where they would be entitled to the minimum wage, 
have limits to the amount of hours they work and be covered by social insurance (at least to some 
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extent) under national labor laws. Or they could be laboring in home-based or center-based locations 
where they are not entitled to the minimum wage, without any limits to their working hours, and do 
not have any forms of social protection guaranteed under national law. However, in the case of 
machine-stitching, this can only be carried out in factory-based environments, and hence football 
stitchers would automatically be covered by the provisions and safeguards ensured under national 
labor laws. As far as struggles over labor standards are concerned, lack of attention to child labor 
eradication might mean that large sections of the stitching workforce continue to work in the 
subcontracted supply chains of local manufacturers in informal home-based settings without any 
protection or recognition under national labor laws. However, actually eliminating child labor from 
the supply chains of local manufacturers might require that home-based stitching as a work form is 
eliminated as it is virtually impossible to effectively monitor thousands of dispersed home-based 
locations for the presence/absence of child labor. In order to make monitoring more effective, 
stitching will have to be centralized in either center or factory-based locations. Hence, while children 
might not longer be involved in football stitching in center or factory-based stitching if this “children 
should not work” norm is followed in production, the remaining population of home-based stitchers 
might suffer considerable social stress and the loss of employment if they are displaced from the 
supply chain and unable to switch to factory-based or center-based production or find alternative 
sources of income. At the same time, eradicating child labor from the supply chains of local 
manufacturers could also be achieved by shifting football stitching from home-based to center-based 
locations. However, in this scenario, football stitchers may still not be covered by any national labor 
legislation. Finally, if compliance with national and international labor standards were to be fully 
achieved, this would require a shift of football stitching from center, and home-based locations to 
factory-based environments. For those stitchers that were able to obtain employment in factory-based 
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stitching, this would mean that they would – in theory – be secured the national minimum wage, 
limits to their work time, and also social protection coverage. However, for the stitchers unable to 
shift to factory-based stitching, the outcome might again by exclusion from the supply chain which 
could other force them to seek alternative forms of employment or sink deeper into poverty.  
 
In the next section of this paper, we turn to an empirical investigation of how these value chain 
struggles have dynamically played out and interacted in the Jalandhar football manufacturing 
industry from the middle of the 20th century until the beginning of the second decade of the 21st 
century.  Our basic concern in the next section is thus to explore how and why home-based, center-
based and factory-based forms of work organization have emerged and developed in the Jalandhar 
football manufacturing industry. We combine this with an analysis of how these processes have 




Value Chain Struggles in Jalandhar Phase I:  
From Factory-Based to Home-based Football Stitching  
The section describes the first phase of value chain struggles in Jalandhar football manufacturing 
industry which resulted in the transfer of factory-based stitching of footballs to home-based locations 
from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. Initially, in the 1950s, football stitching in Jalandhar was 
factory based and a limited number of stitchers were required to do the job as the volume of orders 
was low. Over the years as order volumes increased and the need to comply with labor laws became 
stringent, the exporters started shifting production out of the factory and into the home based 
18 
stitching environment. A major reason for this shift was the provision in the Industrial Disputes Act 
(1947), according to which companies employing more than hundred workers have to seek 
government approval before they can retrench workers or close down the business. Football being a 
seasonal product, the exporters were of the opinion that it was not possible for them to retain the 
workers during the off peak season. Moreover, as the volume of orders had also started increasing in 
the 1960s, it became difficult for the exporters to increase the number of workers in ways that would 
allow them to remove the workers later when the orders reduced during the off peak season. The 
prospective dilemma of collective bargaining and fear of union unrest catalyzed the exporters to shift 
their football production outside the factory, and led to the evolution of home based stitching as a 
work form. By the end of 1950s, approximately half of the production of the exporting firms was 
taking place outside its factory and in the stitchers’ homes through intermediary contractors and 
subcontractors. In the ensuing years the trend of shifting football stitching to home based stitchers 
intensified and by 1970s, football stitching was almost exclusively taking place in home based 
locationsv. 
 
Characteristics of Home Based Units 
In the home based locations in present-day Jalandhar, women start stitching football only after 
finishing their daily household chores, and even in between they have to attend to guests, provide 
lunch, look after children etc. It was found in the course of field work that the stitchers in the home 
based units assemble together in the common room or living room, and stitch under poor light 




The Supply Chain Linking Manufacturers and Home Based Units 
The process of football stitching in the home based units differs with the geographical location of the 
units. These units are primarily based in Jalandhar and its nearby villages, as well as the neighboring 
town of Batala and villages in its vicinity. The vertical supply chain in the Jalandhar football cluster 
exists in one of the three following possible combinations.  
 
1. Manufacturer to Direct Home: This form of production is visible in the areas which are in 
close proximity to the football factories in Jalandhar. The factory issues a slip to the 
stitcher that indicates the name, address, and the number of kits issued to that stitcher. The 
number of kits issued to the stitchers depends on the volume of order received by the firm. 
Each evening the factory issues kits to the stitcher on the slip, which are taken home by 
the stitcher, stitched into footballs and returned to the factory the next evening and further 
kits issued. It is the stitcher’s task to collect the kits from the factory and deliver the 
finished football back there. 
2. Manufacturer to Contractor: This form of production is also visible in the areas which are 
in close proximity to the football factories in Jalandhar and its nearby villages. The 
contractor act as middleman between the company and the home based stitchers. The 
contractor generally is a former stitcher, now working as a contractor, and is responsible 
for getting the kits from the factory, distributing it to the stitchers, receiving the stitched 
football and delivering them to the factory. The biggest challenge facing the contractor is 
finding the location of the stitchers, especially during peak season when there is a shortage 
-of skilled labor. At times the contractors have to refuse the stitching orders from the 
manufacturer because of non-availability of stitchers. The stitchers are hired generally 
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through reference from other stitchers or may themselves approach the contractor for 
work. The study reveals that contractors exhibit a unique paternalistic attitude towards the 
workers, which is manifest in two ways. Firstly, during the off peak season, rather than 
laying off workers, the contractors prefer to proportionately distribute the kits to all the 
stitchers so that each has some source of livelihood, even though it might be inadequate. 
Additionally, they extend credit to the stitchers in form of an advance, which is later 
deducted from their wages. However, the system of credit advance is in fact exploitative 
as it binds the stitcher to a particular contractor and reduces the bargaining power for the 
piece rates. The firm issues kits to a contractor who generally works solely for the firm. 
The contractor then distributes the kits to the stitchers registered with him, collects the 
completed football from the stitchers, and delivers it to the factory; generally on the third 
or fourth day from the date of issue of kits. 
3. Manufacturer to Sub-contractor through Contractor: This form of production comes into 
existence when the contractor does not have the required number of stitchers to complete 
the football order. In this scenario, the contractor further gives the kits to the sub-
contractor to gets the kits stitched from his stitchers. The subcontractor delivers the 
stitched footballs to the contractor, who in turn delivers them to the factory along with 











Football is also sometimes subcontracted from the main football manufacturing industry in Jalandhar 
to home-based units in the city of Batala about 80 kilometers East of Jalandhar when orders are in 
excess of what the local Jalandhar-based stitching population can stitch per day. The organization of 
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the supply chain in Batala differs from that in Jalandhar, in the kind as well as the number of steps 
involved for football production. In the first step, the firm calls the contractor to obtain the synthetic 
leather sheets from the factory and cut them into required panels. The panels are then brought back 
by the contractor to the factory for screen printing and making kits. The firms are averse to allow the 
contractor to print the buyer logo and name on the panels, as the manufacturer is unable to monitor its 
misuse and counterfeiting. These kits with the printed panels are again taken back to Batala by the 
contractor and distributed to the stitchers. The stitched footballs are then delivered back to the 
factory, after three to four days from the issue of the kits. This to and from movement of the raw 
material and the stitched football between Jalandhar and Batala leads to increased transportation 
expenses for the contractor, therefore a group of contractors jointly hire a transport service and share 
the expenses among themselves. However, contractors in Batala report that there have been instances 
when the factory has called them for collecting the sheets but they are not given the order on reaching 
the factory, and even the reimbursement for the transportation costs is rejected by the manufacturer. 











Figure 2b: Home Based Global Supply Chain in Batala 
 
 
Work Conditions in Home-based Units 
A major part of the asset value of the households of home-based stitchers comprises of the current 
value of the residential accommodation owned by the stitchers. The vast majority of the home-based 
stitchers we interviewed live in their own house whereas the remaining stitchers reside in rented 
accommodation. However, all the households surveyed in the study lack productive assets. A key 
finding is that none of the households reported any form of savings and stated that the money earned 
from stitching is spent on their daily household expenses. The level of indebtedness is an important 





2. Cut      









indicator of the economic status of a household. It was reported that none of the stitchers have taken 
any loans. This in itself is unexpected as the general wage conditions in the industry are low. 
According to the National Labour Institute report (NLI, 1998), this can be explained by their inability 
to construe advances from the factory or the contractors as a form of debt. In this context, we found 
that approximately 2/3 of the home-based stitchers took an advance from the factory or the 
contractors. The advances are given by the factory to an amount of INR 3000-4000 (USD 63 – 84vi) 
and INR 500-600 (USD 10 – 13) by the contractor, which is later deducted from the stitcher’s wages, 
along with interest. It is also significant to note that this situation is at a disadvantage for the stitcher 
because they are unable to negotiate with the contractor for the piece rates and hence receive lower 
rates. 
 
Football stitching is a full time activity for all the home-based stitchers that we interviewed as part of 
this study. The monthly mean income of the home-based stitchers that we interviewed in central 
Jalandhar was approximately INR 2864 (USD 60), while it was not possible to calculate any monthly 
income of home-based football stitchers in Batala where the stitchers would sometimes not receive 
orders for several months. A breakup of the household locations in Jalandhar and its surrounding 
villages reveal that the stitchers are totally dependent on football stitching as a source of livelihood, 
with no alternative sources of income. Stitchers in registered home-based locations are paid between 
INR 26-30 per ball (USD 0, 54 – 0, 63). The piece rate in the unregistered home-based locations is 
lower than those given in the registered locations and ranges between INR 25-29 per ball (USD 0, 52 
- 0, 61), but only promotional balls are stitched here. There is also discrimination between the rates 
given to female and male stitchers. For an identical ball the female stitchers are paid INR 23 (USD 0, 
48) and the male stitchers are paid between INR 24.75-30 (USD 0, 52 – 0, 63). In locations in Batala 
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and some unregistered locations, women receive INR 5 (USD 0, 1) for stitching half football (known 
as khokha). The study found that women are not allowed to stitch a full ball by the contractor, who 
prefers to complete the ball himself and earn the extra money apart from his commission. These rates 
include the cost of thread, wax etc. and the net piece rate per football is actually INR 2-3 (USD 0, 04 
– 0.06) lower from the rates mentioned above.  
 
The field discussions reveal that on average a stitcher is able to stitch 3-5 footballs per day, as shown 
below. As per the rates set by the Punjab government, the minimum wage per day for skilled worker 
in sports goods industry is INR 158.75 (USD 3, 3) with effect from September 4, 2009 to February 
28, 2010vii. The calculation of daily earnings based on these rates and the number of balls stitched per 
day (Table 2) show that the daily wage earned by the home-based (INR 91 – USD 1,9) and center-
based stitchers (INR 104 – USD 2,2) we interviewed, therefore, is below the minimum wage set by 
the government.  
Table 3: Average Balls Stitched Per Person Per Day 
 Quality of Balls Balls Stitched Per Person Per Day 
p  Quality Ball 3 
  Ball 4 
 Training 4 
 Promotional 5 
 Volleyball 6 
 Rugby 10 
 Mini Ball 10, 12, 18  
(depending on type) 
 Mini  Rugby 16 
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Stitching footballs manually is a major health hazard for the home-based stitchers as they have to sit 
for long hours in a hunched position that leads to chronic backache. Due to inadequate lighting in the 
stitching locations many stitchers suffer from poor eyesight, which advances with age. The stitchers 
have cuts in their fingers due to pricking of needles and the thread, and even deformations. 
Sometimes, the entire finger of the stitcher gets detached due to the sharp thread and has to be 
surgically treated. As their earning depends on per ball produced, the stitchers carry on with the work 
despite these injuries. The medical expenses are borne by the stitches themselves and have no 
financial support for these work related injuries. Sometimes, the SGFI provides antiseptic ointments 
and bandages to stitchers in home based locations for healing their cuts, but that is not a regular 
feature. 
 
An analysis of the activity status of the stitcher’s children reveals that they are all school going. 
Previous studies (ICN, 2002) have classified children into Working and School Going (WSG), Only 
School Going (OSG), Only Working (OW), Neither Working Nor School Going (NWNSG). 
Regarding the issue of employment of children in football stitching it is interesting to note that there 
is a high level of awareness among the members of the stitching community in Jalandhar and Batala 
about the need to keep out the children from stitching footballs. The stitchers are conscious that 
detection of children in household units will lead to stopping of orders not only to the individual 
stitcher but also has an adverse impact on the industry. At the same time some stitchers and 
contractors believe that the low and stagnant rates in the industry become a compulsion for the family 
to involve children in football stitching. 
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Home-based stitching in Jalandhar is characterized by the virtual absence of collective bargaining for 
the piece rates, which are fixed either by the factory or the contractors and the stitchers are not 
consulted. As the stitchers are landless workers they accept whatever rates they receive, and do not 
have bargaining power over their wage rates. At times, if a stitcher does ask for better rates the 
contractor threatens to give away the football order to other stitchers, forcing the stitcher to accept the 
prevailing rates. This is evident from the fact that in Batala and Adampur, the rates have not been 
increased for almost 10 years. During the off peak season the piece rates further decrease due to a 
lack of orders with the manufacturers. In order to prevent stitcher layoffs, the company and the 
contractors schedule the production by limiting the number of kits distributed to each stitcher, so that 
they are able to provide work to as many stitchers as possible. The stitchers get smaller orders and 
consequently earn less than their normal earning capacity. Some stitchers also report that even if the 
piece rate for football stitching is increased, it is temporary and after two to three months the firms 
revert back to the previous rate. Ironically, the system of advances keeps the stitchers tied to a 
particular contractor and they are forced to work at lower wages. The inability to maximize the 
earnings from football stitching is compelling the workers to shift from stitching to alternative 









Figure 3:  Value Chain Struggles in Jalandhar Phase I: Late 1950s until Early 1970s 
Returning to the overall theme of this article, value chain struggles, we can summarize this section as 
depicted in figure 3 above. Pressures from restructuring of the football manufacturing value chain 
became imminent in Jalandhar towards the end of the 1950s as the volume of international orders 
increased dramatically in these years. As demands for footballs in seasonal in nature, it proved to be 
difficult for local manufacturers to increase the size of their core workforce inside the football 
factories as the 1947 factories act demanded that companies employing more than 100 workers had to 
seek governmental approval before it could retrench any workers or close its business. Combined 
with the fear of trade union unrest and the prospect of having to engage in collective bargaining, 
these factors made the Jalandhar producers transfer football stitching from factory-based to home-
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football stitchers were left being paid less than the minimum wage, without any social protection, and 
suffering from severe occupational health and safety risks associated with their work.  
 
Value Chain Struggles in Jalandhar Phase II:  
From Home-based to Center-Based Football Stitching  
Characteristics of the Stitching Center Model  
Our analysis of value chain struggles in the Jalandhar football manufacturing industry now turns to 
the second phase in which some home-based units were shifted to stitching centers.  As previously 
mentioned, the stitching center model appeared in the Jalandhar cluster towards the end of the 1990s 
in response to international media reports about child labor being involved in football stitching in 
Jalandhar. Discussions with the football manufacturers during the course of study reveal that the 
stitching centers have been established by the firms to meet the compliance standards and the buyer 
requirement of in-house stitching. The manufacturer / contractor owned stitching center model makes 
it easier for the foreign buyer to monitor and prevent use of child labor in its supply chain. According 
to SGFIviii, there are forty stitching centers set up by the manufacturers in Jalandhar and its nearby 
villages. The stitching centers in the city have male workers stitching footballs whereas those in the 
nearby villages of Adampur and Talhan exclusively have women stitchers working in the centers. 
The main feature in the stitching centers established was that stitching was shifted from home based 
units to a centrally, geographically demarcated location, where presence of child labor could be 
monitored, and where more than eight stitchers would assemble together to stitch footballs. Unlike 
the home based units where flexibility of work timings is a key feature, the stitching center is 
characterized by fixed work timings. Although the stitchers in the center have a limited flexibility to 
30 
decide their work timings, better piece rates in the center as compared to the household locations act 
as a key motivator for a worker to join the stitching center. 
 
The Supply Chain Linking Manufacturers and Stitching Centers 
There is a distinct difference in the pattern of working in the stitching centers located in the city from 
those that are situated in the villages. To begin with, the majority of the stitching centers situated in 
Jalandhar are owned by the manufacturer, whereas the centers located in villages are exclusively 
owned and operated by a company registered contractor. In the company owned stitching center 
located in central Jalandhar a supervisor is appointed by the firm to look after the working of the 
center and the quality of production. The center generally tends to have one or more contractors, who 
bring their own stitchers to work in the center. Some stitching centers have up to five contractors 
working at the same time. The supervisor issues the kits to the contractor/s in the center, who then 
distributes the kits to his stitchers working in the stitching center. The stitcher returns the stitched 
footballs to the respective contractor, who along with the supervisor inflates the ball to check for 
defect, and its repair by the respective stitcher. The company transport takes the stitched footballs 
back to the factory for packing and its dispatch to the foreign buyer.  
 
The stitching centers in rural Adampur are operated by independent contractors, who own the 
premises where the center is located. These centers effectively work for only half a day, as the 
company employees bring the kits to the center only at 1.30 / 2 p.m. each day. The contractor then 
distributes the kits to the stitchers, who return back the stitched footballs. The company employees 
then inflate each ball to check for quality, and hand over the defective balls, if any, for repair to the 
stitcher. The vehicle then departs at approximately 6 p.m. with the stitched balls to the factory in 
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Jalandhar. The requirements for a contractor to open a stitching center are the availability of space 
and facilities of electricity, washroom and water. He is then responsible for providing these 
arrangements, taking the attendance of the stitchers, distributing the kits, inspecting the quality of 
stitched footballs and delivering them to the factory. 
 
Work Conditions in Center-based Football Stitching 
The mean income of the center-based stitchers that we interviewed was approximately INR 2370 
(USD 50). However, this reflects a sharp gender-divide in the stitching population as male center-
based football stitchers we interviewed had a mean income of app. INR 3417 (USD 72) whereas the 
female center-based stitchers had a mean income of INR 800 (USD 17). This gender difference is 
explained by male stitchers working on better quality balls with higher rates, working more hours, 
and stitching more footballs per day (4,3 on average) than their female counterparts (1,8 per day). 
The piece rates for stitching top quality footballs in a stitching center ranges between INR 28-36 per 
ball (USD 0, 59 – 0, 75). Almost all center-based based stitchers own their accommodation and many 
of them reported owning durable assets like refrigerator and television, etc. However, similar to the 
home based units, all the households surveyed lacked productive assets and any form of savings. 
Furthermore, the workers in the stitching center reported that none of them have ever taken loans or 
failed to construe the advances taken from the contractor as a form of debt.  
 
The work timings in the Jalandhar based stitching centers generally coincide with the factory timings, 
though some of them are open till late evening for stitching. A number of distinct differences are 
observed in the working of stitching centers based in Jalandhar and those situated in rural Adampur. 
In the city based stitching centers, the balls stitched are of top quality, or match/training balls, which 
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are difficult to stitch and therefore only male, skilled workers are hired. The stitchers work for 
approximate nine hours a day, either from 8.30 a.m. – 5 p.m. or 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. The stitching center 
also provides the stitcher with the flexibility to leave in between if there is a personal work. As some 
of the stitchers’ family members also stitch footballs at home, they assist them in stitching balls on 
Sunday or in completing the tougher task of closing the football. A visit to some of the centers 
revealed that none of them are providing any social security or labor welfare benefits to the stitchers, 
the rates are fixed by the factory and there has been no increase in the piece rates of football stitching 
in recent years. In fact, the stitchers working there reported that the piece rates received for football 
stitching in 2009 are the same as those prevailing twelve years ago. 
 
Unlike the city based stitching centers that employ male stitchers, the two centers in Adampur 
employ women stitchers residing in their vicinity. They work for approximately four to five hours per 
day, as the stitching center operates from 1:00 pm to 6:00 pm. After finishing their household chores 
the women stitchers reach the center at noon, when the kits have arrived from the factory. Though the 
stitchers are provided the flexibility to leave in between, some stitchers complain that the contractor 
is generally reluctant to give the permission. On the other hand, the contractors argue that they are 
liable to explain the stitchers’ absence in the event monitoring is conducted by the company. The 
footballs stitched in the centers are promotional balls, and the stitchers are able to stitch 1-2 balls per 
day. The stitching center does not provide the facilities of fans for ventilation or stool to sit, and the 
stitchers are forced to carry the stool from their home to the center each day. Though the stitchers 
have been brought to the notice of the company officials several times by the workers, but the work 
conditions have not improved.  
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There is also urban-rural and gender differences in the bargaining power of the stitchers. It was found 
that the male stitchers are able to shift between different centers, either when a center closes due to 
lack of foreign orders, for more orders and better rates in another center, or for personal reasons. 
However, evidence suggests that the women stitchers working in the rural stitching centers do not 
have the same freedom to choose their work location. Some women stitchers in Adampur have 
reported that the contractor issues threat of stopping orders to them if they shift to a new center. 
Consequently, they might be compelled to work in a particular center even though there might be 
more work available in another center.  
 
Figure 4:  Value Chain Struggles in Jalandhar Phase II: Late 1990s 
Summarizing this section, we can say that the end of the 1990s witnessed a new kind of value chain 
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on labor standards in the industry. This is depicted in Figure 4. The initial phase in the 1950s and 
1970s had mostly concentrated on how local firms could deal with buyer pressures in terms of 
increasing orders and seasonal shifts in these orders as well as avoid strict labor regulations laid 
down in the Factory Law of 1947. The result had been the outsourcing of footballs from factory-
based to home-based locations. In the second phase of these value chain struggles, a more limited 
change was made as the stitching of some of the better quality footballs was moved from home to 
center-based locations in instances where the buyer required that the absence of child labor could be 
effectively monitored in the stitching process. However, this change facilitated the continued use of 
the subcontracting system even if the subcontractor was now becoming the manager of a stitching 
center as well. It also made it possible for the Jalandhar producers to continue circumventing the 
Factory Act of 1947 as the stitching centers could be kept deliberately below the size of 100 workers. 
Hence, in terms of consequences for workers, the introduction of the center-based model of work 
organization made very few, if any, improvements to the conditions under which football stitchers 
had to labor under. In fact, it may even have worsened some of the gender imbalances that already 
existed in home-based stitching.   
 
Value Chain Struggles in Jalandhar Phase III:                                                                                  
From Center-based to Factory-based Football Stitching  
We now turn to the third and final phase of value chain struggles in the Jalandhar football 
manufacturing industry which commenced in 2008 and is still ongoing at the time of writing this 
article (May 2011). In 2008, the value chain struggle about labor standards in the Jalandhar 
football manufacturing industry re-emerged as a significant factor affecting the future 
development prospects of the industry. First, the International Labor Rights Forum, a 
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Washington-based labor advocacy NGO, produced a report entitled ‘Child Labor in Football 
Stitching Activity in India: a Case Study of Meerut District in Uttar Pradesh’ which implicated 
the Jalandhar producers in the use of child labor in their subcontracted supply chainsix. Second, 
another NGO report was released in the run-up to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing entitled 
‘Clearing the Hurdles – Steps to Improving the Wages and Working Conditions in the Global 
Sportswear Industry’. The report claimed that football stitchers’ wages in Jalandhar had been 
stagnant over the past five yearsx. Finally, the US-based HBO channel aired a programme 
entitled ‘Real sports with Bryant Gumbel’ on 16 September 2008xi alleging that children were 
involved in stitching footballs in the supply chains of local Jalandhar manufacturers supplying 
UK-based soccer ball brand, Mitre.xii  In 2009, one of the largest firms in Jalandhar also lost the 
opportunity to land an order of several million promotional footballs which FIFA had put out a 
tender for via a Singapore-based firm. The proposed contract had required the Jalandhar-based 
firm to be financially liable in case any children were found stitching promotional footballs with 
the FIFA logo on it. As the damages that FIFA could claim would be astronomical, and because 
the Jalandhar-based firm did not have sufficient confidence in its own or the SGFI’s child labor 
monitoring system, it decided not to sign the contract that it was offered.  
 
At the same time, by early 2011, a value chain struggle over supplier upgrading was becoming 
increasingly apparent. This struggle had been latent in the industry for almost a decade with 
Jalandhar-based firms discussing whether they should switch from handstitching to machine-
stitching. As most of them were earning significant profits from their existing handstitching 
business, they had seen little or no incentive to upgrade their production facility to enable them 
to engage in machine-stitching. However, by early 2011, many of the firms were now being 
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compelled to make this switch or close shop as the demand for handstitched balls was rapidly 
coming to an end. Instead international buyers preferred to buy machine-stitched promotional 
balls.  Hence, two of the leading manufacturers in the cluster informed us that they saw no future 
for handstitched promotional balls in Jalandhar. Some of the leading manufacturers in the cluster 
had received significant help from Mitre in order to be able to make the switch to machine-
stitching. One of them informed us that half of their daily production of about 7.000 footballs 
now consisted of machine stitched balls while the remaining half was still in the form of 
handstitched balls. However, another of the larger manufacturers were completely out of orders 
as its main European customers had switched its entire sourcing to China where it was able to 
obtain promotional, machine-stitched balls at a lower price.  
 
As the main competitive strength of the Jalandhar industry was in the low end promotional and 
training handstitched ball market, its future survival seemed to hang very much in the balance at 
this stage. As the title of this article states, the question was whether it was possible to make “a 
last minute save” by rapidly making the switch from center and home-based handstitching of 
footballs to factory-based machine-stitching of these balls. For those manufacturers who had 
managed to partly make the switch to machine-stitching, it appeared as if the introduction of 
machine stitching was associated with a move away from home-based and center-based football 
stitching towards factory-based stitching that was once again emerging as the dominant work 
form in Jalandhar. This switch was required as machine-stitching could not be undertaken in 
home-based units and instead had to be set up as part of production line inside the factory walls. 
As one manufacturer explained to us in early 2011, only the final step of the machine-stitching 
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process where the ball is closed using hand stitching could still be outsourced to center or home-
based locations.  
 
Work Conditions in Factory-Based Football Stitching 
Whereas we did not make a full-fledged series of interviews with the machine-stitchers laboring 
on the new production lines inside some of the Jalandhar-based firms in May 2011, we did 
manage to establish that these were not former hand-stitchers that had shifted from home-based 
stitching to factory-based work. Instead the workers engaged in machine-stitching had often had 
previous training in the stitching of garments or leather items such as gloves that allowed them to 
relatively quickly pick up the skill of machine-stitching. The salary of a machine-stitcher 
working inside these factories was approximately INR 5.000 a month (USD 105) according to 
one of the factory managers that we interviewed. As the monthly income of home-based and 
center-based stitchers had been approximately INR 2370 (USD 50) for center-based stitchers and 
INR 2864 (USD 60) for home-based stitchers during our previous fieldwork in late 2009, 
factory-based stitchers received a substantially higher income than either center or home-based 
stitchers had done. In addition, the new factory-based stitchers were covered by the provisions 
established under the factory-based act. They were thus entitled to the legal minimum wage, 
compensation in case of lay-offs and other forms of social insurance that had neither been 
granted to center or home-based stitchers.  
 
However, whereas the new factory-based machine-stitchers only numbered approximately 500 
workers at the time of our visit in early 2011, the re-emergence of factory-based stitching as a 
dominant work form in Jalandhar effectively forced increasing numbers of home-based stitchers 
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out of the football manufacturing supply chain. One of the leading manufacturers told us that it 
had significantly reduced the radius from which they outsourced handstitced footballs in 
Jalandhar. At the same time, the company’s supply chain towards Batala had completely 
disappeared. Another leading manufacturer of promotional balls had once employed between 
4.000 – 5.000 handstitchers in its supply chain prior to the 2006 World Cup. However, these 
home-based handstitchers were now out of a job. Finally, the process of insourcing production 
into the factories meant that the system of subcontracting was in the process of rapidly 
disappearing from the cluster as the demand for handstitched balls at the promotional level was 
vanishing.  
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In summarizing this section, we can say that two simultaneous struggles are playing out in the third 
phase of value chain struggles that we have identified in this article. The first relates to the re-
emergence of the struggle over labor standards within the industry, and the second to whether local 
producers should mechanize the stitching process through the introduction of machine-stitching 
technology. Whereas the first struggle has negatively influenced the image of the industry abroad and 
led to the loss of export orders, the second struggle constitutes a direct threat to the industry’s 
survival. Hence, while some firms appear to be near closing shop, others are rapidly transferring 
home-based and center-based stitching into factory-based stitching. As a direct outcome, the 
subcontracting system is in the process of being eliminated, and the workforce is once again being 
formalized. In other words, if the first phase of value chain struggles resulted in a process of 
deindustrialization within the Jalandhar football manufacturing industry as factory-based stitching 
was transformed into a cottage industry, the third phase of value chain struggles has now led to a 
process of re-industrialization where a cottage-based industry is transformed into factory-based work 
once again.  
 
DISCUSSION SECTION 
What do we learn from this empirical analysis of the relationship between value chain struggles, 
changing forms of work organization, and outcomes for labor in the football manufacturing industry 
of Jalandhar? We contend that it is possible to analytically relate these value chain struggles, different 
forms of work organization, and outcomes for football stitchers in three idealized scenarios. We call 
these scenarios the virtuous cycle, the vicious cycle, and the real scenario for football stitching in the 
Jalandhar football manufacturing industry. Each scenario represents a possible future development 
path for the industry.  
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In the virtuous cycle, the international demand for machine-stitching footballs is rapidly replacing 
that of handstitching, meaning that the only way forward for the manufacturers in Jalandhar is to 
upgrade to mechanized production if they want to survive. In order to mechanize the football 
stitching process, production must be switched from home-based locations to the factories inside 
Jalandhar. In-house, factory-based football stitching facilitates an increase in the productivity levels 
of local manufacturers as well as compliance with the labor standards requirements of international 
buyers and local labor laws. However, while we call this a virtuous cycle, the home-based 
handstitching population is bound to be displaced. While some may be able to find new sources of 
work in other industries as India’s economy keeps growing, others – especially – female home-based 
stitchers may be left behind which raises the question of whether any social protection mechanisms 
will be able to reduce the negative consequences of this industrial transition.  In other words, 
engaging in supplier upgrading may here result in a win-lose outcome and have short term 
implications, where some firms and machine-based stitchers may gain from this industrial transition 
whereas others may lose out – as in the case of home-based female football stitchers that lose their 
source of income. However, in the second development scenario, the vicious cycle, if the 
manufacturers refuse to switch to machine-stitching, there will be both short term as well long term 
implications, where the local manufacturers will be forced to discontinue their business as the 
existing product that they are offering – i.e. handstiched footballs – will no longer be in demand. As a 
consequence both the home-based and center based handstitchers will lose their source of income and 
new jobs will not be created in the machine-stitching processes inside the Jalandhar football 
manufacturing firms. In other words, this is a lose-lose outcome where both firms and workers in 
Jalandhar pay the price for the industry’s unwillingness to engage in supplier upgrading. This led us 
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to the third scenario, the real scenario. In the real scenario, the Jalandhar producers seemingly have 
the option of continuing business as usual with the production of handstitched balls and reliance on 
an extensive subcontracting system through which the stitching of footballs is outsourced to home-
based and center-based locations. However, in reality, this is no choice as it leaves both the 
manufacturers and the footballs stitchers without any future source of income as the continued non-
compliance with labor standards and refusal to upgrade technologically lead to an inevitable exit 
from the global football manufacturing supply chain. Hence, the only way forward in this Hobson’s 
dilemma is to technologically upgrade, insource the stitching process inside the factories, and fully 




In this article, we had an in-depth look at how the supply chain linkages and different forms of work 
organization have evolved in the Jalandhar football manufacturing industry in India from the mid-
1950s until the beginning of the second decade of the new millennium. We argued that the changes 
observed in supply chain linkages and work organization within the industry can best be understood 
through the prism of value chain struggles. These struggles entailed debates between extra chain 
actors such as international NGOs and national regulatory bodies and intra-chain actors such as 
international buyers and local suppliers over supplier upgrading and labor standards compliance 
within the industry. Initially, factory stitching of footballs was switched to home-based locations as 
local suppliers were trying to cope with increasing international demand for footballs and the 
seasonal production cycles in the industry. This move was also a reflection of the producers’ wish to 
circumvent national labor laws that would improve the conditions of the ever growing workforce 
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within the industry. Towards the end of the 1990s, as the Jalandhar producers were accused of using 
child labor in their subcontracted supply chains, some of the leading producers decided to switch part 
of their football stitching to designated stitching centers where the presence or absence of child labor 
could be strictly monitored. Once again this reflected a strategy on part of the local entrepreneurs that 
they should respond to the demands of international buyers and NGOs to the extent that they would 
be seen as acting in terms of eliminating child labor from their supply chains while ensuring that this 
did not give full rights to the workers under Indian labor laws. In the final stage of our analysis, we 
documented how the Jalandhar producers were caught out attempting to make a last minute transition 
to machine-stitching which would allow them to survive in the face of rapidly declining demand for 
their main product – handstitching promotional footballs.   
 
What emerges from this analysis seems to be three interrelated points. First, international trade 
relations between the Jalandhar producers and their international buyers appear to be tilted in the 
favor of the latter. In other words, the geographical mobility of their buyers in terms of their ability to 
switch sourcing away from Jalandhar and towards other producer locations, China in particular, 
appears to far outweigh the ability of the Jalandhar producers to establish themselves in these other 
sourcing locations. However, while power relations are clearly unequal in this relationship, the 
apparent demise of the Jalandhar cluster also appear to be related to the constant refusal of local 
manufacturers to invent new production processes and comply with international labor standards and 
national labor legislation. In other words, the Jalandhar producers are partly responsible for the 
situation in which they now find themselves. 
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Second, while we agree with Wills idea that subcontracted capitalism is emerging as a world-wide 
force that puts an ever greater number of workers at risk in temporary, insecure, and socially 
unprotected forms of employment, our analysis also suggest that there appears to be limits to how far 
this process can go. In highly “labor standards” sensitive and technologically dynamic industries such 
as the internationally football manufacturing industry, the use of extensive subcontracting networks 
and informalization of the workforce may not necessarily be the way to gain competitive advantage 
in this industry. On the contrary, compliance with national labor laws and international labor 
standards as well as constant technological innovation appear to be a necessary albeit insufficient 
pre-condition for being able to compete in this international industry. At least if the suppliers want to 
sell into the high-end, high value end of the market dominated by international sports brands. 
 
Finally, in terms of policy-making implications of our analysis, we end this article with a call for 
policy-makers, company managers, and labor standards activists to combine the analysis of economic 
forms of upgrading – e.g., the design of new products and manufacturing processes, with attention to 
how vertical supply chain organization and horizontal work organization co-produce outcomes for 
workers engaged in export-oriented manufacturing in developing countries. At present, those 
engaged in designing interventions that aim at technologically upgrading rarely think through the 
social consequences of the policies they advocate. However, labor rights activists mostly criticize the 
workings of the global economy for marginalizing workers in developing country export-industries 
without considering how economic forms of upgrading (or downgrading) may affect workers in 
positive or negative directions. Yet as we have tried to demonstrate in this article, issues of supplier 
upgrading and improvements in workers’ conditions in developing country export industries cannot – 
44 
and should not – be thought of as separate categories. Instead they need to be analyzed jointly as two 
interdependent factors.  
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i The category of inflatable balls also includes other balls such as volleyballs, handballs, rugby balls etc. but 
footballs constitute the major part of this category of balls. 
ii As per Article 24 of the Indian Constitution, no child below the age of 14 years is to be employed in any factory, 
mine or any hazardous employment. The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 prohibits child labor 
in certain occupations and processes alone and their conditions of work are regulated in the rest. 
iii In the last fifteen years, the role of regional production systems, particularly industrial clusters, in developing 
countries have also been widely debated in terms of their ability to effectively articulate joint action industry 
responses to external pressures for compliance with quality, social, and environmental standards that arise from their 
integration into global value chains (see e.g., Nadvi and Barrientos 2004, Tewari and Pillai 2005, Kennedy 1999, 
2006, Nadvi 2007, Almeida 2008, Damiani 2008, Puppim de Oliveiira 2008,  Pyke 2008, Mezzadri 2009. The role 
of joint industry action in facilitating compliance with international social and environmental standards is clearly 
also relevant in the case of the Jalandhar football manufacturing cluster. However, we have dealt extensively with 
this issue in an earlier article (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2009). Hence, this article focuses primarily on the 
relationship between value chains, work organization, and outcomes for labor in the Jalandhar football 
manufacturing industry. 
iv There is also an emerging literature that focuses more specifically on the struggles that take place between 
international buyers and local firms, farmers, and workers over the social and environmental norms that ought to 
guide production in developing country export-oriented industries. These studies highlight that the values embodied 
50 
                                                                                                                                                 
within Western corporate social responsibility standards, labor standards in particular, are often contested by local 
firms, farms, and workers. In fact, sometimes the imposition of the norms and values imposed through standards in 
global value chains are sometimes portrayed as a form of economic and cultural imperialism (see e.g., Blowfield 
and Dolan 2008, Lund-Thomsen 2008, De Neve 2009, Khan and Lund-Thomsen 2011). 
v Interview with Chairman of the Sports Goods Foundation of India, June 2010. 
vi The conversion rate between INR and USD was 47,7 reflecting the average daily exchange rate during the time of 
our primary fieldwork that was undertaken between July and December 2009. 
vii The minimum wages set by the Government of Punjab w.e.f. September 1, 2009 till February 28, 2010 for sports 
goods industry per day is INR 158.75 for Skilled (Upper), INR 147.67 for Skilled (Lower), INR 143.99 for Semi-
Skilled (Upper), INR 137.831  for Semi-Skilled (Lower) and INR 130.71 for Unskilled worker. 
viii Interview with Mr. Ravi Purewal, Project Director, Sports Goods Foundation of India, June 2009. 
ix Ssee http://www.laborrights.org /stop-child-labor/foulball-campaign/1734, accessed 6 May 2011. 
x See http://www.playfair2008.org/index.php?Itemid=61&id=104&option= com_content&task=view, accessed 6 
May 2011. 
xi See http://soccer. fanhouse.com/2008/09/16/indian-child-labor-exploited-in-production-of-soccer-balls, accessed 6 
May 2011. 
xii In this program, several children were interviewed in front of the camera, detailing the physical and mental 
anguish that the child stitchers went through. However, Mitre subsequently launched a law suit in a Manhattan 
Federal court claiming that Mitre had interviews with the parents of some of the children portrayed in the HBO 
documentary. These parents alleged that they had been paid by the documentary’s producers to let their children lie 
in front of the cameras. Two of the children also indicated that they had lied about squatting on dirt floors and 
missing school in order to have the honor of being on television. At the time of writing in May 2011, this law suit 
was still ongoing and has taken up a substantial amount of attention and financial resources in lawyer fees for Mitre 
and the HBO Channel.  
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